Curriculum Vitæ
Publications Available Online
“Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings" (2017). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60. (link)
Abstract: Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their "delusional reality." To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. Delusions are acceptances that are generated by pathologically powerful cognitive feelings. This model has implications for the way that we should think about non-pathological doxastic states and emotions.
"Emotions" (2017). In Philosophy: Mind. Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy series. (link)
"The Rationality Assumption” (2015). In Content and Consciousness Revisited: With Replies By Daniel Dennett. Studies in Mind and Brain Vol. 7. Eds. Muñoz-Suárez, C. and De Brigard, F. Springer. (link to book series; link to Google Books excerpt)
Abstract: Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a presumption of rationality must be built into the deployment of the Intentional Stance. It will be an empirical finding. Rationality will be an outcome of mental state ascription rather than a condition on ascription.
See Dennett's response here (section 4, pages 206-208).